lated to revolutions in that they are abrupt and often lead to the reorganization of the polity.8 It is the assumption of this essay, however, that regime changes that do not include the reorganization of the socioeconomic system-and, first and foremost, the reallocation and reordering of property rights-have outcomes that differ from those of regime changes which involve reordering both systems, the political and the economic. Similarly, evolutionary changes in the structure and distribution of property rights are also not considered revolutions. Aspects of modernization can serve as the long-term causes of revolutions, but constitute a class of events that is analytically distinct from rapid and simultaneous changes in both polity and economy.9
While events may look simultaneous in the broad sweep of history, successful revolutions have a characteristic sequence: change in the state comes first, followed by change in the economy.10 An autonomous and effective state is a necessary condition for carrying out revolutionary economic transformation.1 Paradoxically, therefore, even if 'Writers on democratization often do not make the distinction between changes in the polity and the simultaneous transformation of both the polity and the economy. See Guillermo O'Donnell and the goal of economic transformation is to stimulate market forces and eliminate state planning, a strong state is still needed to extract the state from the economy.
The state is the set of government institutions that define and implement national policy.12 In postcommunist Russia these institutions have included the president's office, the government or Council of Ministers (the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, and so forth), the Supreme Soviet, and the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, as well as the administrative offices, ministries, bureaucracies, and soviets subordinate to these three bodies."3 State power has two main components: autonomy and capacity.14 State autonomy refers to the state's ability to define independent preferences. State capacity is a measure of the state's ability to implement preferences.'5 The degree of consensus within the state is a key determinant of its ability to define preferences independently of leading economic interests groups."6 The effectiveness and cohesiveness of government institutions are key determinants of the state's capacity to implement these preferences.17 State power must also be measured in relation to the strength of the leading interest groups in society.18 The ability of the state to define in- 12 On the distinction between state, government, and regime, see Stephanie Lawson, "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization," Comparative Politics 26 (January 1993); and Robert Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," World Politics 42 (April 1990). In this essay, the term government (pravitel'stvo) has an even more specific connotation. It refers to the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister and deputy prime ministers, appointed by the president but approved (until its dissolution) by the parliament. 13 Of course, many other important institutions such as the army or police are also part of the Russian state. Listed here are only those institutions that have figured prominently in the politics of privatization.
14 Peter Katzenstein, "Introduction: Domestic and International Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy," in Katzenstein (fn. 11), 16; Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
15 Some states define independent preferences but cannot implement them, while others have the capacity to implement independent preferences but do not. 16 The continuum between strong and weak states should not be confused with the range of regime types. While authoritarian regimes are generally considered to be more capable of achieving this internal consensus than are democratic polities, this essay does not make this assumption. Empirical comparisons of successful economic reform in the Third World have demonstrated that authoritarian regimes can be just as weak or weaker than democratic regimes in defining and implementing policies. See Karen Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF 23 This is the rational choice or positivist version of neoinstitutionalism. This essay does not take issue with this theoretical explanation for institutions under the conditions these theorists generally assume. On the contrary, in discussing the evolution of property rights under the Soviet system, this essay draws upon many of the insights from this perspective. It argues that conditions for the spontaneous emergence of collectively beneficial institutions do not exist during periods of revolutionary upheaval. For evolutionary or static approaches to institutions, see F. A. Hayek, "Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct," in Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); and Armen Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory,"Journal of Political Economy 58 (April 1950). For positivist statements about neoinstitutionalism, see Terry tion to occur, however, economic institutions of the ancien regime must be consciously and deliberately destroyed, while new economic institutions and a supportive environment for them must be created.24 In such contexts, these institutions do not change of their own accord; they are changed25-with the state the entity that must make the changes.
Impetus for this institutional destruction cannot be expected to come from social groups that benefited from the ancien regime. On the contrary, the demolition of old institutions threatens the interests, if not the very existence, of these collective identities.26 Social groups of the old order will therefore organize to resist fundamental economic transformation. By contrast, individuals or collective actors that did not benefit from the previous institutional structures can mobilize extrainstitutional or antisystemic organizations-for example, liberation movements, united fronts, or guerrilla armies-to challenge the existing polity and economy. Such a confrontation creates a revolutionary situation in which opposing social groups make competing claims for sovereign authority.27
This condition of dual or multiple sovereignty is resolved only when one side-the ancien regime or the revolutionary challengers-(re)captures the state. If the revolutionaries seize the state, this institution then becomes the principal instrument for destroying old institutions and creating new ones. Endowed with few or no resources from the past system, these revolutionaries rely on the state to destroy old economic institutions and then construct or facilitate the construction of new institutions in support of a new economic order.28 The set of political institutions constituting the state must, however, also be reconfigured in order to be a useful tool of socioeconomic transformation. First, states that have just fallen to revolutionary challengers are weak, whatever their constitution.29 Second, and more importantly, states designed to support and be supported by one form of socioeconomic system do not have the capability to first create and then sustain a new socioeconomic order. "Capitalist" states cannot make "socialist" socioeconomic systems; "socialist" states cannot create the conditions for the emergence of a "capitalist" socioeconomic system. This formulation regarding the process of economic transformation provides an important component missing from both liberal and Marxist (but not Leninist) theories of revolutionary change, and it challenges the neoliberal orthodoxy concerning economic reform in the former communist world. Both Marxist and liberal theories of socioeconomic transformation locate the engine of change within society. Marxist theories identify the cause of revolution as the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production: revolutionary change results when class-based upheavals from below dislodge the ruling class.30 Liberal approaches also identify the causes of revolutionary change within society-whether individual relative deprivation, demographic changes, competing interest groups, or modernization.31 In this conception, revolutionary change is often treated as a temporary albeit sometimes necessary historical event on the road to greater modernization of the socioeconomic system. groups to define a new set of preferences and policies, and powerful enough to act against the interests of leading social forces of the ancien regime."8 This conception of the state's role in economic transformation departs from neoliberal theories and policies regarding transitions to market economies. Orthodox neoliberals fear strong states,39 believing that they use their power to intervene, distort, and prey upon the market. Neoliberals thus favor minimalist governments.40 If the state can only be extricated from the economy, they contend, markets will work: competition will occur, prices will adjust, and resources will be rationally allocated.
Neoliberal economists underestimate the role states play in market economies in providing those institutions that facilitate transactions but are not created by market forces. More importantly, however, neoliberal economists fail to appreciate the critical role of the state in transitions that require the creation of conditions for the emergence of a market economy in a system previously organized according to nonmarket principles.41 Preexisting institutional arrangements that distort free-market competition will not naturally disappear once prices are freed.42 These lagging institutions will continue to distort prices and impede the organic emergence of markets and market institutions until they are deliberately dismantled. Regarding the case of privatization in particular, the neoliberal perspective has failed to account for the fact that property rights had de facto already been allocated according to nonmarket norms and principles during the Soviet era. As explained in the following section, directors of state enterprises were the primary beneficiaries of this Soviet system of property rights. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the fall of 1991, these directors and their claims to property rights were still in place. 38 During revolutionary situations the internal organization of states changes, as do states' capacities. Not surprisingly, the imperative to achieve socioeconomic change has often led to the emergence of more centralized, more powerful regimes. state (hereafter referred to simply as the state) owned all assets. The state de jure claimed all basic property rights of ownership-the right of use, the right to profits from that use, and the right of transfer.47 Like owners of large properties in capitalist economies, however, the Soviet state had to delegate some of these rights to agents in order to make these assets productive. In the case of large state enterprises, the state (the principal) relied on directors (its agents) to represent its interests in the use of this set of assets.48
The Soviet state's ability to monitor the performance and control the behavior of directors weakened over time, as the economy became more complex, the role of the security police declined, and corruption spread.49 Since principals in the Soviet system were huge centralized bureaucracies of the state, individual apparatchiks within these ministerial labyrinths had neither the knowledge nor the incentive to exercise the state's property rights over individual firms. With state ownership of all enterprises, "the depersonalizing of property becomes extreme."50 Because profit levels were set arbitrarily and uniformly, the state as owner--or more specifically the bureaucracies of the state as ownerattached little importance to maximizing these profits. Moreover, measurements in the planned economy were extensive, not intensive, creating easy opportunities for shirking and withholding information.5"
In addition to being unable to monitor agents' activities, the principal also had weak incentive mechanisms for motivating agents to act in the principal's interests. The state did establish production targets, bonus schemes, and the opportunity for advancement within the state 47 hierarchy for successful directors. Nonetheless, throughout the Brezhnev period, actual decisions regarding five-year plans, industrial output targets, and even output goals for individual enterprises were increasingly made at lower and lower levels in the agency chain.52 As Vitaly Naishul has explained: Enterprises (during the Brezhnev era) made requests for resources, which accumulated as they moved up the administrative ladder until they reached an agency authorized to assign production tasks to producers. Then, tasks were distributed among manufacturing enterprises, which responded with new requests for necessary supplies, so that the planning cycle repeated itself over and over again. Brezhnev-era economic planning startedfrom the bottom up, not from the top down as under Stalin; its nature was not directive, but iterative or cyclical.53
The main instrument of control for the principal in the command economy-the plan-was captured by agents who had superior knowledge about the operations of their individual enterprises.
Directors, as knowledgeable agents for indifferent principals, began to acquire de facto property rights over their entities.54 First, they assumed rights to consumption. Because the principal could not monitor all production at the enterprise level, directors had opportunities for personal consumption and exploitation of resources and could also control consumption by other enterprise employees.55
Second, directors made profits. By hiding revenues or skimming extra production, directors supplemented their personal wealth at the expense of the principal.56 An extensive black market offered irresistible opportunities; and there were no market inhibitors to shirking.57 Moreover, under Gorbachev a series of reforms allowing small enterprises and cooperatives further enhanced the directors' opportunities to derive profits from state assets.58 In accordance with these 2 Author interview with Nikolai Ryzhkov. According to Ryzhkov, who worked in Gosplan during the last years of the Brezhnev regime, the Politburo took less than forty-five minutes to approve the annual plan for the entire Soviet economy. new laws, entrepreneurial directors set up parasitic cooperatives, collectively owned entities, lease agreements, and joint ventures, which became profit centers feeding off the assets of large state enterprises.59 All profitable transactions with outside contractors, and especially foreign contractors, were channeled through these small enterprises, leaving profits offshore with little or no benefit to the state enterprise as a whole. Directors thus reaped profits from property without bearing the risks or liabilities associated with total ownership.60 Directors of Soviet enterprises never acquired the third right-the right to transfer property or the right of alienation. But then in the socialist economy, even the principal (the state) could rarely exercise this right.61 The system, that is, had only one de jure owner, making transfers within the Soviet Union meaningless.
Workers constituted a possible alternative claimant to property rights in the Soviet system in competition with the directors. The paternalistic relationship that evolved between directors and employees within enterprises, however, militated against the development of competing interests between these two social groups. The lack of a labor market, the absence of representative, sectorally based trade unions, and the direct provision of many social amenities (housing, kindergartens, medical treatment, vacation homes) by the enterprise gave the directors tremendous control over workers.62 Additionally, trade union bureaucrats at the enterprise worked closely with their directors to ensure worker discipline.63 At the same time, directors and workers were united in their common struggle against the central authorities to lessen their production quotas and shirk on yearly and fiveyear plans. In this institutional setting workers made no claims to 59 60 Overhead and many externalities of these small firms were paid, directly and indirectly, by the state. Government subsidies (i.e., artificially low prices for inputs, extremely low caps for wages, free rent, or negative interests rates on credit lines) were critical to these schemes. In extreme cases, resources transferred from the state to enterprises at low or negligible costs were simply laundered by directors through these cooperatives and joint ventures.
61 Sales of Soviet assets abroad was the one instance when this right was available to the state. property rights that competed with their directors. In sum, Soviet institutional arrangements governing property rights had created welldefined interests and had clearly delineated collective identities and social groups. Well before the drafting of Russia's privatization program, directors had effectively privatized many of the property rights of state enterprises. They therefore had real interests to protect against Yeltsin's attempt to reallocate property rights through privatization. Their campaign to defend these interests was buoyed not only by their powerful position vis-A-vis other societal groups regarding issues of property but also by the state's increasing inability to define and implement a countervailing property rights system.
III. THE DECLINE OF SOVIET AND RUSSIAN STATE POWER
The Soviet regime consolidated by Stalin was one of the strongest states of the twentieth century. Under Stalin, the Soviet state set the creation of socialism (in one country) as its primary objective and then used coercion, violence, and mass murder to accomplish the task. as the "highest state organs."77 Even after Yeltsin's referendum victory in April 1993, the Congress continued to block executive initiatives, constrain ministerial power, and pass laws contradicting Yeltsin's decrees.78 With no formal or even informal institutions to structure relations between the president and the Congress, the state virtually ceased to function. Yeltsin's dramatic actions in September 1993 reflected the degree to which Russia's government had stopped governing. As Yeltsin explained during his address announcing the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies, "In the last few months Russia has been going through a deep crisis of statehood. All political institutions and politicians have been involved in a futile and senseless struggle aimed at destruction. A direct effect of this is the loss of authority of state power as a whole.... [I]n these conditions ... it is impossible to carry out complex reforms." As explained in the following section, this weak state was incapable of restructuring the Soviet property rights system. The shift to a West European ownership structure will require that enterprise governance ... be placed squarely with a supervisory board (or board of directors) controlled by the owners of the enterprise. In essence, privatization requires first that certain ownership rights, now vested in the enterprises, and particularly in the workers' councils, be eliminated so that property rights to an enterprise can be transferred to the real owners.83
IV. THE 1992 PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM FOR LARGE STATE ENTERPRISES

As initially defined by Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and his team in
Outside shareholders were to be created through a mass voucher The first presidential decree on large-scale industrialization (Decree no. 341) had already granted 25 percent of initially offered shares to workers.93 Workers were also given the opportunity to purchase an additional 10 percent at a 30 percent discount. Managers were allowed to purchase 5 percent of all shares at full price. All remaining shares were to be dispersed to individual citizens through a mass privatization program.
These concessions were not enough. Most significantly, the 25 percent share to the workers took the form of preferred (nonvoting) stock, making it possible for outsiders to gain a majority position with only 38 percent of the issued shares. Fearing this outcome, the directors' corps pressed for a second option whereby the workers' collective-an entity that includes both workers and managers-would be allowed to purchase a majority equity stake.
The 98 First, 25% of the shares were given away to workers in Option 1, and an additional 10% were sold at a reduced rate. Under Option 2 the workers' collective had to purchase all 51% of the shares at full value. For very large enterprises workers' collectives had no possibility of raising this initial capital outlay. The state, moreover, offered no special credit lines to workers collectives seeking to borrow these sums. Second, the nominal value of the enterprise as assigned in Option 1 was multiplied by 1.7 if they opted for Option 2. The Gm also discouraged adoption of this second option by regulating very closely the first, closed stage of subscription for shares. If 51% was not purchased by members of the workers' collectives after the initial period, the enterprise in question was immediately privatized according to Option 1. Finally, GM regulations required that Option 2 or Option 3 be approved by twothirds of the workers' collective. If a two-thirds majority was not garnered, the enterprise in question was automatically privatized according to Option 1. GM government allowing special privatization plans (that is, exemptions to the privatization program) very favorable to themselves.101 Such high levels of insider ownership obstruct the realization of the original objectives of the privatization program. Given the magnitude of the agency problems at Russian enterprises, even outside owners would find it difficult to control their inherited directors.102 Without outside owners or at least a minority of shareholders who are outside owners, directors will be even further insulated from the discipline of market forces. They are subject to no real threat of divestment from shareholders. If the directors and workers are also the major shareholders, they have other welfare concerns-first and foremost job security-that take precedence over the goal of maximizing dividend returns on their shares.'03 The threat of outside takeovers is also very weak at enterprises in which insiders own 51 percent or more of all shares. Because boards will be comprised of either existing managers or people with little or no information about the enterprise, disciplinary action by boards of directors against management is also highly unlikely. The labor market for managers-another important disciplinary institution for managers in capitalist economies-is still very weak in Russia. Moreover, as directors assume greater ownership and control of their firm, they will have few incentives to leave it. 102 Information asymmetries between new boards or shareholders on the one hand and old directors with decades of experience at the enterprise on the other will dramatically impede the rational and efficient use of enterprise resources. If a manager has been working for twenty or thirty years at a given enterprise, it is highly unlikely that this individual will immediately submit to the goals and interests of outside and unknown owners. Moreover, the very notion of incentivized, contractual relationships is alien to Russian economic organization. Contracts for directors designed to limit shirking and encourage profit-seeking behavior simply do not exist yet. See Christian Kirchner, "Privatization The state has also institutionalized a legal system to protect property rights, decrease transaction costs, enforce contracts, and ensure competition."' However, the Russian state has devoted few resources to developing a court system capable of defending even investors or property owners, let alone consumers or workers. Contracts must be totally self-enforcing to work, because the state cannot enforce them. these institutions, it is not certain that the institutions taking root will foster the development of privately owned profit-seeking firms. Unregulated stock markets may lead to ownership dominated by bankers and enterprise directors, not entrepreneurs. Within Russia's nascent stock markets, insider trading is the norm, not the exception. Unregulated commodity exchanges have already created incentives for producers of raw materials to export rather than sell domestically. While perhaps a logical market response to the current pricing system, such transfers out of the country arrest already declining domestic production. The Russian state has also not developed a strategy for demonopolizing the economy-antimonopoly commissions have been created at all levels of government, but they have little authority."9 Perhaps most importantly, the Russian state has not created a system of social security. It has not established an effective retirement system, a welfare agency, a plan for job training, or unemployment compensation.'20 Without such a social safety net, the Russian labor market has little fluidity.'2' Workers still rely on their enterprise directors to provide all social services. Enterprise directors in turn can demand state subsidies to cover their wage bill, housing costs, retirement benefits, and so on. In effect, then, state transfers for wage bills in nonproductive enterprises serve as unemployment compensation from the state. If these monies were transferred through an institution independent of the enterprises, however, bankruptcies would be less socially explosive and unemployed workers might be encouraged to find new The Russian state's ability to carry out radical economic transformation may also have been enhanced by a more pluralist system of interest intermediation. In the absence of elections, special-interest groups representing the directors' corps had greater access to and influence over the state than did representatives of other interests. They especially were effective at influencing and controlling the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. Deputies to the Congress were elected in 1990, before political parties existed, before the Soviet Union had collapsed, and well before economic reform had begun. would have been more sympathetic to the original privatization program and less willing to provide credits to state enterprises.
Plans of Central and Eastern European
The relationship between democratization and economic reform may be more complementary than is often assumed.132 In revolutionary transitions, the people may be an ally for the state in its attempt to challenge entrenched interest groups formed under the ancien regime. In the Russian case the majority of citizens-unlike the directors' corps-had little to lose from the breakdown of the old Soviet order.133 A political system that amplifies the role of the masses and squelches the voice of the old elite in state policy-making and policy implementation might prove more capable of undertaking radical economic transformation than even an authoritarian regime. More generally, a democratically elected state has greater legitimacy and authority than does an authoritarian regime to carry out painful economic reforms.134 In other postcommunist transitions, it does appear that those regimes which initiated comprehensive democratic reforms early on (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) were more successful in undertaking real economic transformation than were those countries that did not try to or that had less success at consolidating a democratic polity (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Uzbekistan).
While the actual outcome regarding the creation of private property rights in either the authoritarian or the democratic scenario is difficult to imagine conclusively, both counterfactuals suggest that alternative configurations of state institutions would have led to a different evolu- tion of property rights in Russia. Even though this is only one case study, the outcome of the politics of privatization suggests that decisions or nondecisions made about the institutional design of the Russian state at its genesis in 1991 affected the subsequent path of economic transformation.'35
The drama of Russia's attempt at socioeconomic transformation is certainly not over. These counterfactuals suggest that renewed state resolve to define policies to create free enterprise, coupled with new state capacities to carry out such a program, could eventually lead to the creation of a new system of private property rights in Russia. Although it would be very difficult if not impossible to wrest control of privatizing enterprises from insider owners at this stage, a newly united and determined Russian state could enforce hard budget constraints for these enterprises. By eliminating or strategically allocating credits, the state could still compel enterprises to search for markets and profits, irrespective of who owns the enterprise. A policy that enforces hard budget constraints without a social safety net will be politically explosive. Directors and workers who are also shareholders in bankrupt enterprises will lose twice, creating a very angry and potentially dangerous social force that could challenge the state. To alleviate these social pressures caused by the dislocation of restructuring and rationalizing of assets, the Russian state will have to devote increased resources to developing a social welfare system that includes, among other things, unemployment benefits and job retraining. Only through the establishment of this set of market-supporting institutions can the demolition of the old Soviet enterprise system and the creation of new efficient firms be accomplished."36 A renewed program for creating private property rights must consider not only the reorganization of old assets but also conditions for the creation of new assets. Facilitating market entry for new firms may be as important for the development of private property rights as the dismantling of those institutional arrangement that preserve old Soviet enterprises.
Only a Russian state with enhanced capacity to act against the interests of entrenched social groups from the Soviet regime will be able to implement the policies just described."37 Without a strong state, the 
CONCLUSION
In reflecting on the processes of change in Eastern Europe, Claus Offe noted that "this upheaval is a revolution without a historical model and a revolution without a revolutionary theory. Its most conspicuous distinguishing characteristic is indeed the lack of any theoretical assumptions and normative arguments."'38 This article has attempted to begin to fill this theoretical vacuum about revolutionary change in the former communist world. It has done so not by inventing a new revolutionary theory, but rather by positing a causal relationship between state power and revolutionary economic transformation, and then testing this hypothesis by tracing the relationship between Russian state institutions and the creation of private property rights. By highlighting the importance of institutions in the formation and organization of socioeconomic systems, this article has identified the kinds of critical changes needed to induce revolutionary economic transformation. By identifying the state as the primary instrument for destroying old institutions and creating (or providing the environment for) new institutions, this article has presented a causal explanation for revolutionary outcomes that stands in contrast to both Marxist and liberal theories of societyled change and that is at odds with the orthodox neoliberal approach to reform in transition economies. ment, and the legislature. Perhaps most importantly, the new constitution has helped to prevent political intervention concerning economic issues as the new constitutional configuration of the Russian state delegates to the Russian parliament a consultative role, rather than a primary responsibility for reforming and managing the economy. In the long run, an antireformist or fascist president could use these new rules for very different ends. In the short run, however, this political reform has served to further economic reform. While still too early to assess the implications of this new institutional configuration for economic reform, this new period will provide an important contrasting case to the period examined in this article.
